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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines an empirical link between bureaucratic structures and country-level innovation 
outputs. Although there has been growing scholarly attention to public sector innovation, we still 
have a limited understanding of the relationship between the structures of public bureaucracies and 
country-level innovation. This paper emphasizes the importance of bureaucratic structure in ex-
plaining cross-national variations in country-level innovation outputs. It hypothesizes that countries 
where bureaucrats’ careers are determined by merit-based recruitment rather than political appoin-
tees tend to record higher innovation outputs, controlling for other confounding factors. Countries 
with higher levels of impartiality of bureaucracies in decision-making also tend to have higher inno-
vation outputs. Utilizing cross-national data from the Quality of Government Institute Expert Sur-
vey and Global Innovation Index, findings show that levels of innovation outputs are significantly 
higher in countries that have higher levels of professional and impartial bureaucracies. The results 
suggest the importance of administrative designs to promote innovative activities.  
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Introduction 
There has been growing scholarly attention to innovation in public organizations in recent years. i 
However, the focus of our paper is not public sector innovation, but the level of innovation in a 
country as a whole. In spite of an increasing number of studies on innovation, there have been few 
studies examining cross-national variations in innovation outputs at the national level. In particular, 
scant attention has been paid to how bureaucratic characteristics are associated with innovative 
activities within a country. This article examines a link between administrative designs of bureau-
cracy and country-level innovation by conducting a cross-national study of 108 countries. Although 
bureaucratic control and characteristics have been considered as having negative effects on innova-
tion within the public and private sectors (Damanpor 1996; Dougherty and Corse 1995; Osborne 
and Gaebler 1992; Osborne and Plastrik 1997), recent studies show that Weber’s model of public 
bureaucracy has positive impacts on country-level socio-economic development and possibly on 
innovation (Aucoin 2012; Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2010; Evans and Rauch 1999; Fuku-
yama 2013; Lodge and Gill 2011; Olsen 2006; Rauch and Evans 2000).  
 
The recent development of a unique cross-national data set for bureaucratic structures presents 
tremendous opportunities to empirically test the relationship between variations in bureaucratic 
structures and various socio-economic outcomes (Teorell, Dahlström, and Dahlberg 2011; Dahl-
ström et al. 2015). Taking advantage of such unique data sets, in this study we seek to contribute to 
the emerging literature on the effects of bureaucratic structures on social outcomes in a cross-
national setting (Charron et al. 2017; Cho et al. 2013; Cornell and Grimes 2015; Dahlström, 
Lapuente, and Teorell 2012a; Dahlström and Lapuente 2012, 2017; Fernández-Carro and Lapuente-
Giné 2016; Nistotskaya and Cingolani 2015). 
 
We argue that bureaucratic structures and administrative designs are important explanatory factors 
for cross-national variations in innovation outputs. In particular, this article argues that countries 
where bureaucratic career system is characterized by merit-based recruitment and internal promo-
tion rather than political appointees are likely to have higher innovation outputs. Likewise, those 
with impartial decision-making also tend to record higher innovation outputs. We test these propo-
sitions using a cross-national data set of bureaucratic structures from the Quality of Government 
Institute (QoG) Expert Survey (Dahlström et al. 2015) and Global Innovation Index (GII) (Cornell 
University, INSEAD, and WIPO 2016). Findings suggest that there is a strong link between profes-
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sional and impartial bureaucracies and higher values of country-level innovation outputs, control-
ling for other confounding factors. 
 
This study seeks to contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, this study contributes to 
the literature on administrative designs and societal outcomes by examining the relationship be-
tween bureaucracy and innovation. Second, we incorporate administrative variables in the cross-
national study of innovation and test their impacts. Third, this study contributes to the recent in-
creased interest in contextual factors in public management and performance in a cross-national 
setting (Meier, Rutherford, and Avellaneda 2017; O’Toole and Meier 2014).  
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Despite growing scholarly attention to innovation within the public sector, we still have a limited 
understanding of how differences in bureaucratic structures are associated with country-level inno-
vation. In examining this question, we rely on concepts of bureaucratic incentives and motivation 
for promoting innovation (Berry, Berry, and Sabatier 2014; Teodoro 2009), as well as on business 
actors’ incentives for innovation. Incentives to innovate matter for innovative actions and innova-
tion outputs. For instance, in his widely-cited book, Easterly (2001) emphasizes the importance of 
incentives to innovate by arguing that “[p]rosperity happens when all the players in the develop-
ment game have the right incentives. It happens when government incentives induce technological 
adaptation, high-quality investment in machines, and high-quality schooling” (Easterly 2001, p.289).  
Previous studies on public sector innovation suggest the importance of motivational factors for 
innovation. However, it is not certain whether such incentive structures within public organizations 
also affect innovation at the country-level. However, one can argue that bureaucratic incentives to 
innovate within public organizations can affect innovation outputs in the private sector. Although it 
is not widely acknowledged, studies on public sector innovation suggest that public sector innova-
tion leads to innovations in private and nonprofit organizations (Julnes and Gibson 2016). When 
public organizations are innovative, such innovativeness may have a positive spillover effect on 
private organizations and eventually increase the overall country-level of innovation (Demircioglu 
2017; Edler and Georghiou 2007). Bureaucrats also play an important role in increasing innovation 
outputs as a whole even though private firms are the engine for many innovation outputs (Edquist 
2011; Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012). Smith (2005) argues that building knowledge infra-
structures within the bureaucracy through professionalism enhances innovation outputs and crea-
tive outcomes in the private sector. 
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Bureaucratic Professionalism and Impartiality 
This paper hypothesizes that bureaucratic structures are associated with bureaucracies’ and private 
actors’ motivations to innovate, which leads to innovative activities in a country as a whole. In par-
ticular, we look at professional and impartial bureaucracies. We focus on professionalism and im-
partial public administration for several reasons. First, professionalism and impartial public admin-
istration are core elements of Weberian bureaucracy (Fukuyama 2013; Nelson 1993; Olsen 2006; 
Weber 2009). Wilson (1887) argues that a professionalism and impartial bureaucracy is necessary in 
order to eliminate conflict and increase efficiency in public services. Weberian bureaucracy, particu-
larly in regards to impartiality and professionalism, is a crucial and important measure of the quality 
of governance. Therefore, analyzing how these elements affect social outcomes is important (Fuku-
yama 2013).  
 
Second, bureaucratic professionalism and impartiality are the two core ideas of the post-NPM and 
neo-Weberian administration (Lodge and Gill 2011). The central goal of the post-NPM and neo-
Weberian administration is to overcome the limitations of NPM’s specialization, fragmentation, and 
marketization. Third, how to achieve a professional and impartial bureaucracy is an important re-
search topic for some countries, particularly formerly socialist countries. Following their argument, 
Neshkova and Kostadinova (2012, p.325) argue that two major goals of the administrative reforms 
in the postcommunist Eastern European countries are depoliticization, which is similar to impar-
tiality, and professionalization of bureaucracies. Their study suggests that these bureaucratic re-
forms were very beneficial for reducing public sector corruption and increasing foreign direct in-
vestments (FDI).  
 
a. Bureaucratic Professionalism 
The first dimension of bureaucratic structures we examine is professionalism (Dahlström, 
Lapuente, and Teorell 2012a; Silberman 1993), which refers to the degree of meritocracy and politi-
cization in bureaucracies. Professional bureaucracy is characterized by merit-based recruitment and 
internally recruited senior officials rather than political appointee or political network-based re-
cruitment (Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2010, 2012b). Higher levels of professionalism indi-
cate more professionally-oriented bureaucracies rather than politicized bureaucracies. Modern bu-
reaucratic structures bring about more professionalism, which may affect social outcomes (Egeberg 
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2012). However, the level of professionalism in each country is different. Such professionalism can 
enhance employee motivation to innovate (Demircioglu 2017).  
 
How is bureaucratic professionalism associated with bureaucrats’ motivation for supporting and 
promoting innovation? In a meritocratic recruitment system, public sector organizations can select 
more competent and skillful bureaucrats than they can in a politicized one. Bureaucracy can “recruit 
the best possible personnel, and merit recruitment is the logical means of filling positions with the 
best qualified personnel” (Peters 2010, p.83). In contrast, a lack of professional public administra-
tion reduces chances for the hiring of employees who are knowledgeable and expert in policy areas 
with higher commitment to their jobs. In addition, politicized bureaucracies tend to be unstable 
(e.g. with high turnover, particularly for talented employees), which reduces bureaucrats’ motiva-
tions to engage in projects and perform well (Cornell 2014). 
 
Furthermore, when bureaucrats are professional, business actors can invest in innovative activities 
with less fear or uncertainty because bureaucratic professionalism increases business actors’ trust in 
government policies and regulations, which subsequently increases innovative activities in a society 
(Fukuyama 1995). Likewise, professional bureaucrats with skills and expertise increase business 
actors’ trust in the government and create an environment in which business actors are willing to 
invest in innovation (Fukuyama 1995).  
 
In sum, public officials in more professional bureaucratic structures are likely to have more exper-
tise, long-term perspective, and are less influenced by patronage and political interests than those in 
more politicized system where political and personal connections matter. They are also less likely to 
be willing to act on behalf of short-term political interests. Therefore, professional bureaucracies 
are likely to be correlated to innovation in society. Accordingly,  
 
H1: Bureaucratic professionalism is positively associated with country-level innovation outputs. 
 
b. Impartial Bureaucracy 
Impartiality has two meanings. Citizens should “be treated impartially in the administration of pub-
lic affairs,” and public servants should “not act in ways that advantage or disadvantage the partisan-
political interests of any political party, including the governing party or parties” (Aucoin 2012, 
p.179). Weber states that bureaucracy needs to be impartial, and bureaucrats should be appointed 
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and function as “personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal offi-
cial obligations” (Weber, 1968, 333). The impartial bureaucracy provides consistency and the gener-
alizability of the rules and applications; therefore, it increases fairness and justice (Peters 2010). 
Impartial bureaucracy affects bureaucrats’ motivations to work and perform better (Peters 2010), 
which can also have positive spillover effects on business and society. 
 
Easterly (2001) states that the public sector should create incentives with democratic and well-
established institutions so that the private sector can grow. For instance, Nistotskaya and Cingolani 
(2015) argue that meritocratic recruitment and tenure protection of public bureaucracies assure 
impartiality and stability in the implementation of rules for entrepreneurs. Their work empirically 
demonstrates a link between meritocratic recruitment and entrepreneurship and individual choices 
to engage in new businesses. In fact, bureaucratic impartiality helps business actors make invest-
ments in innovation. Overall, bureaucracies can increase private actors’ incentives for innovation by 
using policy tools, such as legal and administrative regulations and R & D programs, leading to an 
increase in the overall innovation outputs of a country (Smith 1997). Impartiality can also increase 
trust, and trust can lead to a more innovative bureaucracy (Fukuyama 1995).  
 
Finally, since the late 1980s, public services in general and public procurement in particular has 
moved from supply-side to demand-side approaches (Petersen et al. 2016). It has been found that 
demand-side approaches such as citizens’ demands for government services can boost innovation 
outputs in the private sector (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012). In this regard, when bu-
reaucracies are professional and impartial, private actors can ask for more government support and 
resources for innovation without fear, which encourages more innovative activities. Taken together, 
these insights and findings from the existing literature lead us to hypothesize: 
H2: Impartial public administration is positively associated with country-level innovation outputs. 
 
Research Design 
Data Collection 
Cross-national comparison is very common as a research method in the field of political science. 
However, unfortunately, little comparative research has been done in the study of public admin-
istration and bureaucracy (Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012b; Eglene and Dawes 2006; Fitz-
patrick et al. 2011; Sundell 2014). In this study, we utilize data from the Quality of Government 
(QoG) Institute Expert Survey II (Dahlström et al. 2015), which is a novel cross-national data set 
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of bureaucratic structures collected from country expert surveys. One of the novel contributions of 
the QoG Expert Survey is that it provides a quantitative assessment of Weberian bureaucracy, 
which has been empirically overlooked (Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2010). The survey was 
designed based on pioneering work on mapping the bureaucratic structure in 35 less-developed 
countries by Peter Evans and James Rauch (Evans and Rauch 1999; Rauch and Evans 2000). The 
first version of the survey was conducted by a group of researchers at the QoG Institute in 2008-
2012, which led to the first Expert Survey data set (Teorell, Dahlström, and Dahlberg 2011). The 
Expert Survey II was carried out in 2014. The Expert Survey II data was collected from survey 
responses from 1,294 country experts covering 159 countries. The survey asks for expert percep-
tions of the current status and characteristics of a country’s public bureaucracy. The survey ques-
tions are mainly centered on bureaucratic structures such as recruitment and career system. The 
QoG Expert Survey data has been used in many academic publications, including top public ad-
ministration journals.ii This confirms the validity and reliability of the datasets.  
 
Our main dependent variable is country-level of innovation outputs. The data is obtained from the 
database GII (Cornell University, INSEAD, and WIPO 2014). The GII has been established as a 
leading reference on innovation at the country level since the late 2000s. It ranks the innovation 
performance of countries and economies around the world. The GII project was launched by IN-
SEAD (Institut Européen d'Administration des Affaires) in 2007. The 2014 report covers 143 
economies around the world. Data contained in the report were gathered from various existing 
statistical data. The GII report is published annually, and the latest version was released in 2016. 
The dependent variables are obtained from the online database of the GII (Cornell University, 
INSEAD, and WIPO 2016). We utilized data in the 2014 report for the dependent variables and 
the 2013 report for control variables.  
 
The data set contains two aspects of innovation: innovation input and innovation output. The in-
novation input index captures various national factors that enable innovative activities, including 
institutions, human capital and research, infrastructure, market sophistication, and business sophis-
tication. The innovation output index looks at the results of innovative activities in a country, fo-
cusing on knowledge and technology outputs and creative outputs. Given the purpose of our re-
search, which assess the impact of bureaucratic structure at the country-level of innovation, we 
focus on the output aspect of innovation. Several academic researchers on innovation have utilized 
the GII data (Crespo and Crespo 2016; Meissner 2015; Sohn, Kim, and Jeon 2016; Zhan, 
  9 
Bendapudi, and Hong 2015). We also utilize the QoG Standard Dataset 2017 (Teorell et al. 2017) iii 
and GII report 2013 (Cornell University, INSEAD, and WIPO 2016) for control variables. The 
QoG Expert Survey II, which provides independent variables, was carried out in 2014. Our de-
pendent variable, innovation output scores, is obtained from the GII 2014 report data.  
 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable is the overall level of innovation output in each country. Innovation output 
is a common measure used by most studies of innovation (Smith 1997). In order to measure the 
degree of innovation output, we use innovation output scores from the GII. Specifically, we look at 
1) knowledge and technology output and 2) creative output. In each area of innovation, an output 
score is calculated. In GII, each innovation output score is divided into three sub-components. The 
knowledge and technology output score consists of three sub-components: 1) knowledge creation, 
2) knowledge impact, and 3) knowledge diffusion. Each sub-component is made from four to five 
individual indicators. The list of indicators included in each category is listed in table A1 in the ap-
pendix.  
 
Each sub-component score is calculated as the weighted average of its individual indicators. Then, 
the knowledge and technology output score is calculated as the weighted average of its sub-
component score. The resulting score ranges from 11.2 to 60.9 in the 108 countries in our sample. iv 
The creative output category consists of three sub-components: 1) intangible assets, 2) creative 
goods and services, and 3) online creativity. The creative output score is calculated in a similar way. 
The creative output score in our sample ranges from 0.6 to 66.1.v The distribution of each score is 
reported in the appendix.  
 
Independent Variables 
The independent variable is structure of public bureaucracy. In particular, we focus on 1) bureau-
cratic professionalism and 2) bureaucratic impartiality. To measure bureaucratic structure, the inde-
pendent variables from the QoG Expert Survey look at the employment system in the public sec-
tor, which is a core concept of Weberian bureaucracy.  
The first independent variable is bureaucratic professionalism. The QoG Expert Survey data set 
contains an index of bureaucratic professionalism, which is constructed from the following four 
questions: 1) “When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants de-
cide who gets the job,” 2) “When recruiting public sector employees, the political connections of 
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the applicants decide who gets the job,” 3) “The top political leadership hires and fires senior public 
officials,” 4) “Senior public officials are recruited from within the ranks of the public sector.” Re-
spondents are asked to select a scale from 1 (hardly ever) to 7 (almost always). The data set reverses 
the scale of the second and third questions, therefore higher values mean more professionalism. 
The professional bureaucracy index is constructed by using the mean value for each responding 
expert of the four questions. Higher values in the bureaucratic professionalism index indicate more 
professional-oriented bureaucrats rather than political-oriented ones.  
 
The second independent variable is bureaucratic impartiality. We rely on the index of impartiality 
contained in the QoG Expert Survey. This index measures the degree of impartiality of bureaucra-
cies in decision-making. Higher values mean higher impartial exercise of power.vi The index is con-
structed based on the mean values of the following five survey items. 1) “Firms that provide the 
most favorable kickbacks to senior officials are awarded public procurement contracts in favor of 
firms making the lowest bid,” 2) “When deciding how to implement policies in individual cases, 
public sector employees treat some groups in society unfairly,” 3) “When granting licenses to start 
up private firms, public sector employees favor applicants with whom they have strong personal 
contacts,” 4) “Generally speaking, how often would you say that public sector employees today, in 
your chosen country, act impartially when deciding how to implement a policy in an individual 
case?” and 5) “Hypothetically, let's say that a typical public sector employee was given the task to 
dis-tribute an amount equivalent to 1000 USD per capita to the needy poor in your country. Ac-
cording to your judgement, please state the percentage that would reach: The needy poor.” The 
cross-country variations in the above two measurements are presented in Figures A3 and A4 in the 
appendix.  
 
Control Variables 
This study controls for other factors that are expected to be correlated to country-level innovation. 
A small sample size does not allow us to include a large number of controls. Therefore, we limit the 
number of controls to five important factors. We control for 1) GDP per capita (Current Prices) 
(ln), 2) GDP growth (%), 3) country-level of democracy, 4) government fractionalization, and 5) 
number of researchers per million population. The first four variables are obtained from the QoG 
Standrad Dataset (Teorell et al. 2017), and the last variable is from the GII report 2013 (Cornell 
University, INSEAD, and WIPO 2016).   
  11 
We control GDP per capita and GDP growth because previous research shows that these variables 
affect innovations at the national level (Fagerberg and Srholec 2008; Lee et al. 2016; Wong, Ho, and 
Autio 2005). Country-level of democracy and government fractionalization may affect country-level 
of innovation. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue, national elites may hamper innovations 
because of their fear of replacement. Innovations may erode the advantage of the incumbent politi-
cal elites and increase chances of replacement. When political competition is limited, elites may be 
unwilling to initiate changes in the economy and other institutions. We use a simple dichotomous 
democracy measurement as well as fractionalization in government.vii The government fractionali-
zation measures “[t]he probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government 
parties will be of different parties” (Dahlberg et al. 2017b, p.52).  
 
Because of the high correlations to our independent variables and other control variables such as 
GDP per capita, we do not include control variables that are related to input aspects of innovation, 
such as government expenditure on R&D, quality of scientific research institutions, and university-
industry collaboration in R&D. We do not include the government expenditures on R&D because 
this input measure is highly correlated with innovation output measures such as our dependent 
variables. For instance, Wong, Ho, and Autio (2005) state that some scholars have used either input 
measures (e.g. R& D expenditures) or output measures (e.g. number of innovations), but not both 
in the same model. Likewise, Lee et al. (2016) find that innovation input (R&D) and output are 
highly correlated, as seen in the case of Japan, which is ranked highly for both measures. In addi-
tion, professional bureaucracy and impartial bureaucracy are also highly associated with variables of 
resources and infrastructure for innovation, which may cause multicollinearity.  
 
The summary statistics of the variables used in our study are reported in Table 1. Correlation ma-
trix is reported in Table 2. We conducted collinearity diagnostics using VIF based on our main 
models with two samples (all countries and OECD). The highest VIF score for the independent 
and control variables in all of the models is 3.41 (GDP per capita). This means that the models do 
not have problems in terms of multicollinearity. For the purpose of a further robustness check, we 
ran analysis for the same model without the variable causing high correlation.  
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TABLE 2, CORRELATION MATRIX 
       1     2     3     4     5     6     7    8   9 
1 Knowledge and technology outputs 1 
        2 Creative outputs 0.77 1
       3 Bureaucratic professionalism (H1) 0.59 0.56 1
      4 Bureaucratic impartiality (H2) 0.68 0.78 0.79 1
     5 GDP per Capita (Current Prices)  0.81 0.80 0.67 0.80 1
    6 GDP Growth (%) -0.42 -0.38 -0.31 -0.39 -0.46 1
   7 Dichotomous democracy measure 0.35 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.38 -0.38 1
  8 Government Fractionalization Index 0.34 0.38 0.20 0.22 0.25 -0.36 0.31 1
 9 Researchers, headcounts/mn pop 0.71 0.78 0.63 0.74 0.84 -0.50 0.34 0.40   1 
 
 
Empirical Strategy 
Given the cross-sectional nature of our dataset, our purpose is not to make causal arguments but to 
identify an empirical association between them. Given the nature of the dependent variable, we 
employ OLS regression analysis. The independent variables are bureaucratic structures. Since corre-
lations among the independent variables are high, we are not able to include two independent vari-
ables in a single model. Thus, we test the following three models for each of our two independent 
TABLE 1, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
    
Knowledge and technology outputs 31.43 12.29 11.2 60.9 
Creative outputs 34.27 12.84 0.6 66.1 
Independent variables 
    
Bureaucratic professionalism (H1) 3.93 0.96 2.0 6.19 
Bureaucratic impartiality (H2) 3.99 1.22 1.6 6.29 
Control variables 
    
GDP per Capita (Current Prices)  15,489.90 14,321.64 332.27  57,634.77  
GDP Growth (%) 3.37 3.13 -6.979 11.91  
Dichotomous democracy measure 0.71 0.46 0 1 
Government Fractionalization Index 0.23 0.28 0 0.82 
Researchers, headcounts/mn pop 18.46 22.27 0.10 100.00 
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variables. In the first model (Models 1 and 4), we investigate the bivariate relationship between 
bureaucratic structure and innovation outputs. In the second model (Models 2 and 5), we include 
control variables that may affect the dependent variables. This is to test alternative explanations for 
the effects on innovation. Control variables, including GDP per capita, GDP growth, and democ-
racy measure, are included. In the third model (Models 3 and 6), further control variables, govern-
ment fractionalization index and researcher headcounts, are included to show the robustness of our 
analysis. The fractionalization index is included as an additional control for political competitive-
ness. We use the researcher headcount variable as one of the infrastructure variable for innovation. 
We run a same set of models for two dependent variables.  
 
We test our hypotheses in two samples. One uses all the country samples. The other uses only 
OECD member countries. We conduct two separate analyses for the following reasons. First, the 
association between bureaucratic structure and country-level innovation may differ depending on 
levels of economic development and other unobservable factors. Second, bureaucratic professional-
ism and impartiality are highly correlated to levels of economic development measured by GDP per 
capita (correlation coefficients are 0.67 and 0.80). Therefore, in order to test the robustness of our 
assessment, we conduct an analysis using only samples from developed economies.  
 
To demonstrate the robustness of our results, we conducted the following robustness strategy. 
First, we estimated Huber-White sandwich estimators in all main models, responding to issues of 
heterogeneity and lack of normality. Second, we re-ran all models for each independent variable 
with a jack-knife estimator in order to address the concern of influential observations. Third, we re-
ran the same models without the GDP per capita variable, which is highly correlated to most of our 
independent variables. Collinearity diagnostics show no serious problems regarding multicollineari-
ty. However, as a further robustness check, we estimated the same models without GDP per capita. 
Results of the robustness check are reported in the appendix.   
 
Analysis and Results 
Figures 1 and 2 show a bivariate relationship between bureaucratic characteristics and country-
levels of innovation. We present these figures mainly to show how these two factors are associated. 
As shown from these figures, countries with higher levels of professionalism and impartiality tend 
to record higher levels of innovation measured by knowledge and technology outputs as well as 
creative outputs.  
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FIGURE 1, BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY OUTPUTS 
 
 Note: Samples are based on model 1.  
 
FIGURE 2, BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND CREATIVE OUTPUTS 
 
Note: Samples are based on model 1.  
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Knowledge and technology outputs 
Having presented scatterplots of the correlation between independent and dependent variables, we 
now present the results of regression analysis for all country samples in table 3. As seen from the 
table, bureaucratic professionalism and impartiality variables consistently have a strong association 
with the knowledge and technology outputs score at more than 95% level of confidence. In the 
bureaucratic professionalism model (Models 1-3), Model 1, which only has the professionalism 
variable, explains 35% of the variation in the model. The professionalism variable is positive and 
statistically significant at the 99% level. Country-levels of innovation should be correlated to eco-
nomic development and democracy. Higher levels of developed economies tend to have larger and 
high-quality resources and infrastructure for innovation, such as financial resources, good research 
institutions, and qualified researchers in both the private and public sectors. Therefore, controlling 
GDP captures these factors as well. When we add GDP per capita, GDP growth, and democracy 
measure variables, R-Squared increases to 65%. Coefficient of the professional bureaucracy variable 
drops from 7.54 to 3.96; however, it is still significant at the 99% level of confidence after control-
ling these factors. In Model 3, we add two further control variables, government fractionalization 
and number of researchers per population in million. Bureaucratic professionalism is still positive 
and significant at the 99% level even after controlling these additional factors that may potentially 
affect the dependent variable.  
 
In Models 4-6, we test the impact of bureaucratic impartiality on knowledge and technology out-
puts. Here, results show a strong association between these two variables. Bureaucratic impartiality 
alone explains 45 of the variation in Model 4. Impartiality is positive and statistically significant at 
the 99% level. Coefficient drops from 6.75 to 2.76 in Model 5 after we add three control variables. 
In Model 6, which includes additional control variables, impartiality is still positive and significant at 
the 95 % level. Therefore, bureaucratic impartiality positively influences knowledge and technology 
outputs.  
 
  16 
 
Table A2 and A3 in the appendix report results of the same model estimations with jack-knifed 
estimates as well as those without GDP per capita. We reran the same models with jack-knifed 
estimator responding to the concern for influential observation. We also reran the models without 
GDP per capita to address the concern of high correlation between this variable and independent 
variables. Results with jack-knifed estimations are almost identical to those in our regular models in 
terms of direction of coefficients and statistical significance (see Table A2). Coefficients of bureau-
cratic variables increase in our models without GDP per capita, as we expect. Statistical significanc-
es do not change from the main models. Significance of the impartiality variable even increases in 
Model 6. To summarize the results of the models using all country samples, results of OLS regres-
sion analysis show that bureaucratic professionalism and impartiality are positively associated with 
innovation measured by technology and knowledge outputs. Bureaucracies with either of these 
characteristics tend to have higher levels of innovation as a nation, controlling for other factors.  
Table 4 reports estimation results of models with only OECD member countries. Recall that we 
conducted a separate analysis using only OECD country samples to see if the results change in 
more developed settings. Bureaucratic professionalism and impartiality are positive and significant 
at the 99% level of confidence in our first model (Models 1 and 4). This is the same result as the 
TABLE 3, BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY OUTPUTS SCORE, 
RESULTS OF OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS (ALL COUNTRY SAMPLES) 
 
 Professionalism model Impartiality model 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables             
Bureaucratic professionalism (H1) 7.54*** 3.96*** 3.32*** 
   
 (0.90) (0.75) (0.97) 
   Bureaucratic impartiality (H2) 
   
6.75*** 2.76*** 2.04** 
 
   
(0.66) (0.78) (0.98) 
Controls 
      GDP per Capita (ln) 
 
5.92*** 5.23*** 
 
5.68*** 5.10*** 
 
 
(0.81) (0.98) 
 
(0.84) (0.95) 
GDP Growth (%) 
 
-0.44 -0.21 
 
-0.46 -0.22 
 
 
(0.34) (0.34) 
 
(0.35) (0.36) 
Dichotomous democracy measure 
 
-1.33 -2.31 
 
-1.54 -3.07 
 
 
(1.88) (2.12) 
 
(1.89) (2.09) 
Government Fractionalization 
  
5.13* 
  
5.84** 
 
  
(2.72) 
  
(2.80) 
Researchers, headcounts/mn pop 
  
0.05 
  
0.07 
   
(0.07) 
  
(0.07) 
Constant 1.80 -35.19*** -28.44*** 4.70* -28.12*** -22.50*** 
 
(3.46) (7.37) (8.65) (2.64) (6.78) (8.06) 
       
Observations 108 100 81 107 99 83 
R-squared 0.35 0.65 0.69 0.45 0.63 0.67 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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models with all country samples. However, these variables lost statistical significance in Models 2-3 
and 5-6, which are more restricted. It is not surprising because the sample size is between 28 and 
33. 
 
We conducted the same set of robustness checks, namely models with jack-knifed estimators and 
models without GDP per capita variable. Models with jack-knifed estimates show almost identical 
results with our main models in terms of direction and statistical significance of coefficients of the 
independent variables (Table A4 in appendix). This confirms the robustness of our results. In mod-
els without GDP per capita (Table A5 in the appendix), bureaucratic professionalism is positive and 
statistically significant at the 99 level in all models (Models 1-3). The same goes for bureaucratic 
impartiality (Models 4-6). Bureaucratic professionalism and impartiality are positively associated 
with innovation. However, the same result is confirmed in our main models using OECD samples 
(Table 4).  
TABLE 4, BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY OUTPUTS 
SCORE, RESULTS OF OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS (OECD COUNTRY SAMPLES) 
 Professionalism model Impartiality model 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables             
Bureaucratic professionalism (H1) 5.32*** 0.03 2.26 
   
 (1.30) (1.30) (1.92) 
   Bureaucratic impartiality (H2) 
   
4.66*** -0.41 1.20 
 
   
(1.20) (1.33) (1.67) 
Controls 
      GDP per Capita (ln) 
 
19.50*** 14.45* 
 
20.36*** 17.01** 
 
 
(5.18) (6.99) 
 
(5.30) (6.44) 
GDP Growth (%) 
 
0.35 0.03 
 
0.38 0.09 
 
 
(0.49) (0.51) 
 
(0.50) (0.49) 
Dichotomous democracy measure 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
      Government Fractionalization 
  
9.63 
  
7.45 
 
  
(5.72) 
  
(5.01) 
Researchers, headcounts/mn pop 
  
-0.08 
  
-0.07 
   
(0.06) 
  
(0.06) 
Constant 19.32*** -157.63*** -116.34* 20.04*** -164.31*** -138.02** 
 
(6.19) (50.23) (65.06) (6.07) (50.83) (60.50) 
       
Observations 33 33 28 33 33 28 
R-squared 0.26 0.51 0.63 0.23 0.51 0.61 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Creative outputs 
Now, we will look at the impacts of bureaucratic structures on innovation measured by creative 
outputs in our global sample. Recall that the dependent variable is the creative outputs score, which 
assesses country-levels of intangible assets, creative goods and services, and online creativity (See 
Table A1 in the appendix). Bureaucratic professionalism is positive and statistically significant in 
Models 1-2. When we add further control variables to the model, its coefficient is still positive, but 
its significance drops to the 90% level. Therefore, it is safe to say that it is not certain whether there 
is a significant empirical link between professionalism and creative outputs. In Models 4-6, we test 
how bureaucratic impartiality is associated with innovation. Impartial implementation of public 
policies increases fairness and justice, which subsequently leads to business investment for innova-
tive activities. Although coefficients of impartiality are reduced as we add more control variables, 
they are positive and significant consistently across three models. This means that bureaucracies 
which have more impartial decision-making tend to have higher levels of innovation.  
 
As a robustness check, we repeated the same procedure that we performed for the first dependent 
variable. Models with jack-knifed estimates show almost identical results with respect to bureaucrat-
ic impartiality (See Table A6 in the appendix). Results of models without GDP per capita also show 
similar results with our main models (Table A7). Bureaucratic impartiality is positive and statistically 
significant at the 99% level. Its coefficient increases to 7.5 (Model 5) and 4.66 (Model 6). This con-
firms the robustness of our results. To summarize our analysis of all samples, results suggest that 
bureaucratic impartiality tends to have a positive influence on innovation operationalized by crea-
tive outputs.  
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Finally, we look at the results of the same models, but with only the OECD member countries. 
Table 6 reports results of OLS regression analysis on creative outputs. Unlike the result from the 
global sample analysis, bureaucratic impartiality is no longer significant in the most restricted model 
(Model 6) even though it is significant at the 90% level in Model 5.  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Although there are an increasing number of studies on innovation, the analysis for most of these 
studies occurs at the organizational level. There have been only a few cross-national studies that 
examine factors affecting innovation across countries. Although ideas of bureaucratic structure go 
back to Max Weber in the last century, we still have a very limited understanding of how bureau-
cratic structures are associated with innovative activities at the country level. By relying on concepts 
of bureaucratic motivation for innovation, this paper contributes to filling this research gap.  
 
TABLE 5, BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND CREATIVITY OUTPUTS SCORE, RESULTS OF OLS 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS (ALL COUNTRY SAMPLES) 
 Professionalism model Impartiality model 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables 
      Bureaucratic professionalism (H1) 7.48*** 3.33*** 2.24* 
   
 (1.21) (0.81) (1.12) 
   Bureaucratic impartiality (H2) 
   
8.30*** 5.06*** 3.87*** 
 
   
(0.72) (0.73) (1.07) 
Controls 
      GDP per Capita (ln) 
 
5.83*** 3.50*** 
 
4.03*** 2.52** 
 
 
(1.00) (1.31) 
 
(0.89) (1.09) 
GDP Growth (%) 
 
-0.09 0.31 
 
-0.03 0.24 
 
 
(0.25) (0.25) 
 
(0.22) (0.24) 
Dichotomous democracy measure 
 
6.99*** 6.37*** 
 
4.82*** 4.57** 
 
 
(1.92) (2.13) 
 
(1.69) (1.88) 
Government Fractionalization 
  
3.60 
  
4.65 
 
  
(3.23) 
  
(3.01) 
Researchers, headcounts/mn pop 
  
0.21*** 
  
0.16** 
   
(0.06) 
  
(0.07) 
Constant 4.87 -36.59*** -16.44 0.70 -26.18*** -12.34 
 
(4.72) (9.21) (11.95) (2.96) (7.25) (9.75) 
       
Observations 94 88 72 92 86 73 
R-squared 0.31 0.68 0.75 0.61 0.75 0.78 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In this study, we hypothesized that there is an empirical link between administrative structures of 
public bureaucracy and country-level innovation outputs. We expected this link based on previous 
studies and theory of bureaucratic structure and public sector innovation. We argued that recruit-
ment and promotion rules affect work-related behavior of public sector employees, which subse-
quently affects levels of innovation outputs within a country. In professional bureaucracy, bureau-
crats are recruited and promoted based on merit and expertise rather than political connections. In 
such an administrative structure, bureaucrats entering the public sector are likely to have higher 
expertise and skills than those who are hired through political connections. Therefore, such indi-
viduals with higher skills are likely to be more motivated to be innovative than those who are in 
politicized administrative structures. They might be more likely to learn about new tools and ideas 
and take a long-term perspective, which contribute to innovation. In addition, employees in more 
professional-oriented bureaucracies tend to be insulated from patronage and political interests 
(Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012a). Therefore, bureaucrats in a professional system tend to 
be free from political discretion and can implement programs to promote innovation. In impartial 
bureaucracies, bureaucrats are expected to implement policies with fairness. Such impartial deci-
sion-making and policy implementation creates trust among private actors, which positively affects 
innovation outputs. In addition, a high level of neutrality in administrative decision-making deters 
bureaucrats from corruption. Such favorable bureaucratic characteristics for innovation should help 
private actors to achieve more innovative outputs. 
 
The analyses demonstrate that administrative structures matter for the variation in levels of innova-
tion outputs across countries. When using all country samples, results show that countries with 
higher levels of professional and impartial bureaucracies are likely to have higher knowledge and 
technology outputs. When we restrict our samples to OECD member countries, we find that these 
bureaucratic characteristics are no longer as significant. With respect to the creative outputs, we 
demonstrate that impartiality is positively correlated to innovation in our global sample analysis. 
This confirms our impartiality hypothesis. When we use OECD samples, we do not find statistical-
ly significant relationships between any of the administrative variables and creative outputs. The 
above results are consistent with findings from previous empirical studies that show a string empir-
ical link between professional and impartial bureaucracies and social outcomes. This study contrib-
utes to previous studies by testing the relationship between bureaucratic structures and innovation 
outputs.  
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It is important to recognize the limitations of this research. First, given the cross-national nature of 
our dataset, we do not claim a causal relationship. Even though it is unlikely that bureaucratic struc-
tures change within a short period of time, our analyses show results of a snapshot of bureaucratic 
structures and innovation outputs at a given time period, without considering factors that change 
across time (Evans 2002). Second, we did our best to incorporate various control factors into our 
analysis with the limited sample size of countries. However, we cannot completely rule out the 
possibility that other unobservable country-level factors affect the bureaucratic structure-innovation 
relationship. These weaknesses should be further compensated for by testing the external validity of 
the results through conducting subnational studies, in which researchers account for more variables 
as well as collect and analyze time series data of bureaucratic structures and innovation.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE A1, PERCENT SUMMARY OF THE KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY OUTPUTS SCORE 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A1, LIST OF INDICATORS IN THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge and technology outputs Indicator Creative outputs Indicator
Domestic resident patent app/bn PPP$ GDPa Domestic res trademark app/bn PPP$ GDP
PCT resident patent app/bn PPP$ GDPa Madrid trademark applications/bn PPP$ GDP
Domestic res utility model app/bn PPP$ GDP ICTs & business model creation
Scientific & technical articles/bn PPP$ GDP ICTs & organizational model creation
Citable documents H index Cultural & creative services exp., % total tradea
Growth rate of PPP$ GDP/worker, % National feature films/mn pop. 15–69
New businesses/th pop. 15–64 Global ent. & media output/th pop. 15–69
Computer software spending, % GDP Printing & publishing manufactures, %
ISO 9001 quality certificates/bn PPP$ GDP Creative goods exports, %
High- & medium-high-tech manufactures, % Generic TLDs/th pop. 15–69
Royalty & license fees receipts, % total trade Country-code TLDs/th pop. 15–69
High-tech exports less re-exports, % tot. Trade Wikipedia monthly edits/mn pop. 15–69
Comm., comp. & info. services exp., % tot. Trade Video uploads on YouTube/pop. 15–69
FDI net outflows, % GDP
Knowledge creation
Knowledge impact
Knowledge diffusion
Online creativity
Creative goods and services
Intangible assets
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FIGURE A2, PERCENT SUMMARY OF THE CREATIVE OUTPUTS SCORE 
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FIGURE A3, VARIATIONS IN BUREAUCRATIC PROFESSIONALISM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 108 countries in model 1 are included in the above figure. 
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FIGURE A4, VARIATIONS IN BUREAUCRATIC IMPARTIALITY 
 
Note: 107 countries in model 7 are included in the above figure.  
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TABLE A2, BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY OUTPUTS SCORE, 
RESULTS OF OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS (ALL SAMPLES, JACKKNIFED ESTIMATES) 
 Professionalism model Impartiality model 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables             
Bureaucratic professionalism (H1) 7.54*** 3.96*** 3.32*** 
   
 (0.92) (0.77) (1.05) 
   Bureaucratic impartiality (H2) 
   
6.75*** 2.76*** 2.04* 
 
   
(0.67) (0.82) (1.07) 
Observations 108 100 81 107 99 83 
R-squared 0.35 0.65 0.69 0.45 0.63 0.67 
Standard errors in parentheses 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        Note: Control variables are not reported.  
TABLE A3, BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY OUTPUTS SCORE, 
RESULTS OF OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS (ALL SAMPLES, WITHOUT GDP PER CAPITA) 
 Professionalism model Impartiality model 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables             
Bureaucratic professionalism (H1) 7.54*** 6.98*** 4.11*** 
   
 (0.90) (0.92) (1.36) 
   Bureaucratic impartiality (H2) 
   
6.75*** 6.19*** 3.61*** 
 
   
(0.66) (0.83) (1.26) 
Observations 108 101 81 107 100 83 
R-squared 0.35 0.45 0.58 0.45 0.49 0.57 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      Note: Control variables are not reported. 
TABLE A4, BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY OUTPUTS SCORE, 
RESULTS OF OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS (OECD SAMPLES, JACKKNIFED ESTIMATES) 
 Professionalism model Impartiality model 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables             
Bureaucratic professionalism (H1) 5.32*** 0.03 2.26 
   
 (1.37) (1.43) (2.16) 
   Bureaucratic impartiality (H2) 
   
4.66*** -0.41 1.20 
 
   
(1.27) (1.51) (2.06) 
Observations 33 33 28 33 33 28 
R-squared 0.26 0.51 0.63 0.23 0.51 0.61 
Standard errors in parentheses 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      Note: Control variables are not reported. 
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TABLE A5, BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY OUTPUTS SCORE, 
RESULTS OF OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS (OECD SAMPLES, WITHOUT GDP PER CAPITA) 
 Professionalism model Impartiality model 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables             
Bureaucratic professionalism (H1) 5.32*** 5.31*** 5.71*** 
   
 (1.30) (1.30) (1.38) 
   Bureaucratic impartiality (H2) 
   
4.66*** 4.65*** 4.58*** 
 
   
(1.20) (1.23) (1.61) 
Observations 33 33 28 33 33 28 
R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.53 0.23 0.23 0.45 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      Note: Control variables are not reported. 
TABLE A6, BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND CREATIVE OUTPUTS SCORE, RESULTS OF OLS 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS (ALL SAMPLES, JACKKNIFED ESTIMATES) 
 Professionalism model Impartiality model 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables             
Bureaucratic professionalism (H1) 7.48*** 3.33*** 2.24* 
   
 (1.24) (0.84) (1.20) 
   Bureaucratic impartiality (H2) 
   
8.30*** 5.06*** 3.87*** 
 
   
(0.73) (0.77) (1.16) 
Observations 94 88 72 92 86 73 
R-squared 0.31 0.68 0.75 0.61 0.75 0.78 
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      Note: Control variables are not reported 
TABLE A7, BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND CREATIVE OUTPUTS SCORE, RESULTS OF OLS 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS (ALL SAMPLES, WITHOUT GDP PER CAPITA) 
 Professionalism model Impartiality model 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables             
Bureaucratic professionalism (H1) 7.48*** 6.29*** 2.80** 
   
 (1.21) (0.93) (1.17) 
   Bureaucratic impartiality (H2) 
   
8.30*** 7.50*** 4.66*** 
 
   
(0.72) (0.69) (1.10) 
Observations 94 89 72 92 87 73 
R-squared 0.31 0.50 0.71 0.61 0.68 0.76 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      Note: Control variables are not reported. 
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TABLE A8, BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND CREATIVE OUTPUTS SCORE, RESULTS 
OF OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS (OECD SAMPLES, JACKKNIFED ESTIMATES) 
 Professionalism model Impartiality model 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables             
Bureaucratic professionalism (H1) 4.67*** -0.15 -0.08 
   
 (1.34) (2.10) (2.09) 
   Bureaucratic impartiality (H2) 
   
5.54*** 2.57 1.32 
 
   
(0.89) (1.63) (1.64) 
Observations 30 30 27 30 30 27 
R-squared 0.25 0.45 0.65 0.40 0.49 0.66 
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      Note: Control variables are not reported. 
TABLE A9, BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND CREATIVE OUTPUTS SCORE, RESULTS OF OLS 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS (OECD SAMPLES, WITHOUT GDP PER CAPITA) 
 Professionalism model Impartiality model 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables             
Bureaucratic professionalism (H1) 4.67*** 4.68*** 2.07 
   
 (1.27) (1.30) (1.60) 
   Bureaucratic impartiality (H2) 
   
5.54*** 5.54*** 2.64* 
 
   
(0.87) (0.88) (1.42) 
Observations 30 30 27 30 30 27 
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.61 0.40 0.40 0.63 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      Note: Control variables are not reported. 
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i See, for example, De Vries, Bekkers, and Tummers (2015) and Walker (2014). 
ii
 See, for example, Boräng, Nistotskaya, and Xezonakis (2017); Charron, Dahlström, and Lapuente 
(2016); Cho et al. (2013); Cornell (2014); Cornell and Grimes (2015); Dahlström and Lapuente (2017); 
Fernández-Carro and Lapuente-Giné (2016); Gustavson and Sundström (2016); Kopecký et al. (2016); 
Nistotskaya and Cingolani (2015); Sundell (2014); Schuster (2016); Van de Walle et al. (2016); Versteeg 
and Ginsburg (2016); Van de Walle, Steijn, and Jilke (2015). 
iii
 As for the data year of control variables from Teorell et al. (2017), the dataset mainly uses data from 
2013. If data for 2013 is missing, data for 2014 is included. Then when no data exists for 2014, data for 
2012 is included. 
iv
 Number of sample is based on model 1 with the knowledge and technology outputs as a dependent 
variable. 
v
 Number of sample is based on model 1 with the creative outputs as a dependent variable. 
vi
 The impartiality is defined as “[w]hen implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not 
take into consideration anything about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or 
the law” (Rothstein and Teorell 2008, p.170). 
vii
 We tested the mean of the Freedom House and Polity scales, which ranges from 0 to 10 contained in 
the QoG Basic Dataset 2017 (Dahlberg et al. 2017a). However, the variable is highly correlated to bu-
reaucratic impartiality (pairwise correlation coefficient is 0.61). Therefore, we decided to use a dichoto-
mous variable for democracy (the highest correlation coefficient, which is one with impartiality is 0.46). 
